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SEPARATION OF POWERS IN GHANA: THE EVOLUTION OF THE POLITICAL 
QUESTION DOCTRINE 
MO Mhango* 
1 Introduction 
In most constitutional democracies, political disputes or contestations will likely end 
up in the courts. When this happens, the principles of judicial independence and 
separation of powers are threatened. As one South African judge recently warned in 
Mazibuko v Sisulu1 there is a threat to judicial independence when the judiciary is 
drawn in to resolve political questions that are beyond its competence or 
jurisdiction.2 He further said: 
An overreach of the powers of judges, their intrusion into issues which are beyond 
their competence or intended jurisdiction or which have been deliberately and 
carefully constructed legally so as to ensure that the other arms of the state deal 
with these matters, can only result in jeopardy for our constitutional democracy. In 
this dispute I am not prepared to create a juristocracy and thus do more than that 
which I am mandated to do in terms of our constitutional model.3 
The difficulty that confronts democracies is how to jurisprudentially resolve political 
questions that end up in the courts while at the same time preserving the separation 
of powers. In some democracies, notably Nigeria, Uganda, Ghana, United States and 
Israel, judiciaries have developed what is commonly referred to as the political 
question doctrine to jurisprudentially resolve political questions and define their 
relationship with other branches of government. The political question doctrine is a 
function of the principle of the separation of powers, and it provides that there are 
certain questions of constitutional law that are constitutionally committed to the 
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1  Mazibuko, Leader of the Opposition in the National Assembly v Sisulu MP Speaker of the National 
Assembly 2012 ZAWCHC 189 (22 November 2012) (hereafter Mazibuko v Sisulu). 
2  See Mazibuko v Sisulu 256E-J. 
3  See Mazibuko v Sisulu 256H-J. Also see Mazibuko, Leader of the Opposition in the National 
Assembly v Sisulu MP Speaker of the National Assembly 2013 ZACC 28 (27 August 2013) para 83 
(Jafta J minority opinion) (noting that "political issues must be resolved at a political level; that 
our court should not be drawn into political disputes, the resolution of which falls appropriately 
within the domain of other fora established in terms of the Constitution"). 
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elected branches of government for resolution.4 As a result, such questions are non-
justiciable and require the judiciary to abstain from deciding them if doing so would 
intrude upon the functions of the elected branches of government.5 The underlying 
theme is that such questions must find resolution in the political process.6 
This article examines the development and current status of the theme of the 
political question doctrine in Ghanaian jurisprudence, which was developed from 
American jurisprudence. It begins by briefly discussing the history of the political 
question doctrine and its modern application in the United States of America. It then 
discusses the application of the political question doctrine in Ghana. It argues that 
while there are differences of opinion around the application of the political question 
doctrine, the doctrine is firmly part of Ghanaian constitutional law. It observes that 
the differences of opinion among judges in Ghana is over the proper application of 
the doctrine rather than whether or not it forms part of Ghanaian constitutional law. 
The article also discusses another related issue, which is the constitutional status of 
Directive Principles of State Policy in chapter 6 of the Constitution of Ghana and 
whether or not these principles are justiciable. 
2 Brief history of the political question doctrine 
The political question doctrine was first enunciated in Marbury by the United States 
Supreme Court when it held that the principle of the separation of powers makes 
certain questions non-justiciable because adjudicating those questions would intrude 
                                               
4  See Redish 1984 NWU L Rev 1031; Breedon 2008 Ohio NU L Rev 523 (explaining that the 
purpose of the political question doctrine is twofold. The first purpose, which is rooted in the 
Constitution's separation of powers, is to ensure proper judicial restraint against exercising 
jurisdiction when doing so would require courts to assume responsibilities which are assigned to 
the political branches. The second purpose is to ensure the legitimacy of the judiciary by 
protecting against the issuing of orders which courts cannot enforce); Wechsler Principles 11-14; 
Yoshino 2009 Willamette Law Review 559 (arguing that the political question doctrine is a 
doctrine of justiciability, noting that other such doctrines include standing, ripeness, mootness, 
and the bar on advisory opinions; that the justiciability doctrines underscore the idea that there 
can be rights without judicially enforceable remedies); and LaTourette 2008 Rutgers LJ 219 
(arguing that the political question doctrine is a function of the separation of powers). 
5  Redish 1984 NWU L Rev 1031; Breedon 2008 Ohio NU L Rev 523; Wechsler Principles 11-14; 
Yoshino 2009 Willamette Law Review 559; LaTourette 2008 Rutgers LJ 219. 
6  Redish 1984 NWU L Rev 1031; Breedon 2008 Ohio NU L Rev 523; Wechsler Principles 11-14; 
Yoshino 2009 Willamette Law Review 559; LaTourette 2008 Rutgers LJ 219. 
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on the powers of the political branches of government.7 In addition, Marbury is 
prominently known for holding that "… it is, emphatically, the province and duty of 
the judicial department to say what the law is".8 With this holding Marbury laid the 
foundation for the exercise of judicial review in modern democracies across the 
globe. While the holding in Marbury is famously known to have claimed the power of 
judicial review, it also recognized limitations on that power and said: 
The province of the court is, solely, to decide on the rights of individuals, not to 
inquire how the executive, or executive officers, perform duties in which they have 
discretion. Questions in their nature political, or which are, by the constitution and 
laws, submitted to the executive, can never be made in this court.9 
With this pronouncement the court in Marbury instructed the judiciary to dismiss 
cases if the constitution's text, structure, or theory signified that an issue should be 
decided by an elected branch of government.10 Based on this articulation, Marbury 
recognized a clear distinction between legal questions that the judiciary must decide 
and political questions they must allow the political branches to remedy.11 As Fallon 
has commented, Marbury not only represents the fountainhead of judicial review, 
but also "... furnishes the canonical statement of the necessary and appropriate role 
of the judiciary in the constitutional system founded on the principle of separation of 
powers".12 It is for this reason that some commentators have defended the political 
question doctrine on the grounds of the separation of powers, arguing that a 
Constitution should be viewed as assigning responsibility for interpreting or enforcing 
certain constitutional provisions to the elected branches of government.13  
Since Marbury, the Supreme Court has applied the political question doctrine in a 
number of cases.14 The case of Baker v Carr15 is perhaps the clearest articulation of 
                                               
7  Marbury v Madison 5 US (1 Cranch) 137 (1803) 170 (hereafter Marbury). For a discussion of the 
evolution of the political question doctrine, see Atlee v Laird 347 F Supp 689 (DCPa 1972) 692. 
8  Marbury 177. 
9  Marbury 170. 
10  Pushaw 2002 NCL Rev 1192-1193. 
11  See Shrewsbury 2002 Mil L Rev 166; Stephens 2004 Tenn L Rev 241, 245; and Price 2006 NYU J 
Int'l L & Pol 323, 331. 
12  See Fallon 2003 CLR 5. 
13  Chemerinsky Constitutional Law 77; Imam et al 2011 Afr J L & Crim 50; Koohi v United States 
976 F 2d 1328 (9th Cir 1992); EEOC v Peabody W Coal Co 400 F 3d 774 (9th Cir 2005) 785. 
14  See Luther v Borden 48 US 1 (1849); Colegrave v Green 328 US 549 (1946); Gray v Sanders 372 
US 368 (1963); Reynolds v Sims 377 US 533 (1964); Wesberry v Sanders 376 US 1 (1964); 
Avery v Midland Country 390 US 474 (1968); and Wells v Rockefeller 394 US 542 (1969). 
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the criteria for determining what constitutes a political question. Briefly, the case 
involved the question of whether an equal protection challenge to malapportionment 
of state legislatures is a non-justiciable political question. The court in Baker v Carr 
set out what could be described as the modern articulation of the political question 
doctrine and ruled that a determination of whether state malapportionment of state 
legislatures violated the plaintiffs' equal protection rights under the United States 
Constitution was not a political question.16 Justice Brennan, who wrote for the 
majority in Baker v Carr, announced six criteria for assessing when a case may be 
dismissed under the political question doctrine.17 These criteria are: 
[1] textually demonstrable constitutional commitment of the issue to a coordinate 
political department; [2] or a lack of judicially discoverable and manageable 
standard for resolving it; [3]or the impossibility of deciding without an initial policy 
determination of a kind clearly for non-judicial discretion; [4] or the impossibility of 
a court's undertaking independent resolution without expressing lack of the respect 
due coordinate branches of government; [5] or an unusual need for unquestioning 
adherence to a political decision already made; [6] or the potentiality of 
embarrassment from multifarious pronouncements by various departments on one 
question.18 
According to Justice Brennan, the existence of one criterion is sufficient to invoke 
the political question doctrine. However, Justice Brennan emphasised the limited 
reach of the political question doctrine so that "... it is used sparingly in the context 
of a demonstrable political question devoted to the elected branches and not simply 
to cases that involve political issues".19 Further, Justice Brennan explains that the 
                                                                                                                                                  
15  Baker v Carr 369 US 186 (1962) (hereafter Baker). 
16  Baker 197-198. 
17  Baker 217. 
18  Baker 217. Also see Tribe American Constitutional Law 96 (discussing the different strands of the 
political question doctrine announced in Baker). 
19  Baker 217; Free 2003 Pac Rim L & Pol'y J 467, 489 (arguing that the political question doctrine 
does not allow courts to dismiss suits merely because they address controversial political issues); 
LaTourette 2008 Rutgers LJ 282 (arguing that given the complexities associated with 
anthropogenic global warming, and the highly politicized nature of the issue, there is an obvious 
concern that courts will continue to use the political question doctrine to ward off otherwise 
justiciable controversies that relate to climate change); Barkow 2002 Colum L Rev 253, 262-263 
(discussing the prudential strand of the political question doctrine and its problems arguing that 
it allows courts to avoid rampant activism by staying out of certain matters); Fickes 2009 Temp L 
Rev 525, 531 (noting that the judiciary can hear politically charged cases without invoking the 
political question doctrine, and discussing the case of Bush v Gore 531 US 98 (2000), which was 
heard even though it involved political questions); Willig 2010 Cardozo L Rev 723, 732 (arguing 
that it is a mistake to assume that every case which touches on foreign policy is nonjusticiable); 
Chase 2001 Cath U L Rev 1045, 1055 (observing that although recognising that the political 
question doctrine serves to protect the separation of powers doctrine, the adjudication of certain 
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benefit and purpose of the political question doctrine is to preserve the separation of 
powers and minimise claims that have the potential to undermine this principle.20 
Some members of the United States federal bench have gone so far as to suggest 
that the political question doctrine serves to prevent the federal courts from 
intruding unduly on certain policy choices and judgments that are constitutionally 
committed to the United States Congress or the executive branch.21 According to this 
view, a nonjusticiable political question exists when, to resolve a dispute, a court 
must make a policy judgment of a legislative or executive nature, rather than resolve 
the dispute through the application of the law.22  
A further benefit of the political question doctrine is that it minimises judicial 
intrusion into the operations of the other branches of government and allocates 
decisions to the branches of government that have superior expertise in particular 
areas. Scharpf has been an advocate of this view and has argued, for example, that 
the Supreme Court has rightly treated many constitutional issues concerning foreign 
policy to be political questions because of the greater information and expertise of 
the other branches of government.23 Nearly four decades ago Bickel and Scharpf 
offered one of the most influential academic defences of the political question 
doctrine. In their commentaries, Bickel and Scharpf treat the political question 
doctrine as one of the devices that the judiciary utilise to define the relationship with 
other branches and acknowledge that courts share responsibility for interpreting a 
Constitution with the other branches of government.24 According to Bickel and 
Scharpf, entangling the courts with the other institutions of the political system in 
ways that would not benefit the nation is imprudent.25 For Bickel and Scharpf, the 
                                                                                                                                                  
claims remains possible because the political question doctrine does not prevent a court from 
hearing a case simply because it involves a political issue). 
20  Baker 217; Tribe American Constitutional Law; Free 2003 Pac Rim L & Pol'y J 467, 489; 
LaTourette 2008 Rutgers LJ 282; Barkow 2002 Colum L Rev 253, 262-263; Fickes 2009 Temp L 
Rev 525, 531; Willig 2010 Cardozo L Rev 723, 732. Also see Lane v Halliburton 529 F 3d 548 
(2008). 
21  Koohi v United States 976 F 2d 1328 (9th Cir 1992). 
22  EEOC v Peabody W Coal Co 400 F 3d 774 (9th Cir 2005). 
23  Scharpf 1996 Yale LJ 517, 567, 583-584. 
24  Bickel Least Dangerous Branch 183-197 (advocating for the prudential political question 
doctrine); Scharpf 1996 Yale LJ 517, 538. 
25  Bickel Least Dangerous Branch 183-197; Scharpf 1996 Yale LJ 517, 538. 
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political question doctrine provides the Supreme Court with techniques for refraining 
from deciding cases on the merits when doing so would be unwise.26  
Since Baker v Carr was decided, the Supreme Court has dismissed cases on the 
basis of the political question doctrine. The first notable case was Gillian v Morgan,27 
where the Supreme Court ruled that courts should not examine the training of the 
Ohio National Guard because doing so would invade critical areas of responsibility 
vested by the Constitution in the legislative and executive branches of government.28 
In a second case, Nixon v United States,29 the Supreme Court ruled that the 
impeachment of a judge was a political question and therefore not justiciable.30 
Despite the fact that the Supreme Court has not invoked the political question 
doctrine in recent years, federal cases reveal that lower courts frequently apply the 
doctrine in the adjudication of constitutional cases.31 Based on the analysis of these 
federal cases, it could be argued that the discourse around the political question 
doctrine among judges and academics has centered on ensuring a consistent 
                                               
26  Tushnet 2002 NC L Rev 1203-1204. 
27  Gilligan v Morgan 413 US 1 (1973) (hereafter Gilligan). 
28  Gilligan 6. 
29  Nixon v United States 506 US 224 (1993) (hereafter Nixon). See Levinson and Young 2001 Fla St 
U L Rev 925 (discussing Nixon). 
30  Nixon 236. 
31  See Mulhern 1988 U Pa L Rev 97, 106 (defending the political question doctrine and noting that 
the doctrine is more prominent in the opinions of the lower federal courts). For some of the 
cases that demonstrate this frequent application of the political question doctrine, see Gonzales-
Vera v Kissinger 449 F 3d 1260 (2006) (where the victims and survivors of human rights abuses 
carried out by the Chilean government brought action against the United States alleging torture). 
The Court of Appeals affirmed that the claims were non-justiciable under the political question 
doctrine. It reasoned that to evaluate the legal validity of the drastic measures taken by the 
United States to implement its policy with respect to Chile would require it to delve into 
questions of foreign policy textually committed to a coordinate branch of government); 
Schneider v Kissinger 412 F 3d 190 (2005) (where the Court of Appeals affirmed the lower 
court's decision to dismiss on the grounds that the claims involved non-justiciable political 
questions. In addressing concern about the effects of leaving political questions to the political 
process, the court reasoned that the lack of judicial authority to oversee the conduct of the 
executive branch in political matters did not leave executive power unchecked because political 
branches effectively exercise checks and balances on each other in the area of political 
questions); Arakaki v Lingle 423 F 3d 954 (9th Cir 2005); Corriee v Caterpillar 503 F 3d 974 (9th 
Cir 2007) 980, 982-984 (where the Israeli Defence Forces (IDF) ordered bulldozers directly from 
Caterpillar but the United States paid for them. The family members of individuals, who were 
killed when the IDF used bulldozers to demolish houses in Palestinian territories brought action 
against Caterpillar alleging that it provided the IDF equipment used in violation of international 
law. The court affirmed that the political question doctrine barred it from hearing the matter. It 
reasoned that allowing this action to proceed would necessarily require it to question the political 
decision to grant military aid to Israel); and Schroeder v Bush 263 F 3d 1169 (2001). 
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application of the doctrine.32 While inconsistent application of any legal principle is 
not desirable, it can be expected in the development and application of a complex 
concept like the political question doctrine.33 Courts always disagree and at times 
become unclear in the development and application of a significant number of legal 
principles but this does not mean the principles at issue are discredited or should be 
abandoned.34 Due to its prominence, the political question doctrine has been 
adopted and applied in Ghana.  
3 The application of the political question doctrine in Ghana 
Like in the United States, the political question doctrine has been considered by 
courts in Ghana since the early 1980s.35 However, not only have courts and legal 
commentators disagreed about its wisdom and validity, they have also varied 
considerably over the doctrine's scope and rationale.36 In fact, they have even 
diverged over whether or not the doctrine is applicable under Ghanaian 
constitutional law, given the contested case authority that adopted it.37 However, 
                                               
32  See Finkelstein 1924 Harv L Rev 338, 344-345 (noting that there are certain cases which are 
completely without the sphere of judicial interference. They are called political questions); and 
Redish 1984 NWU L Rev 1031-1032 (arguing that academic debate on the political question 
doctrine has centred on the principled use of the doctrine, and that the doctrine is very much 
alive in Supreme Court decisions). 
33  See Jaffe 2011 Ecology LQ 1033, 1043-1063 (discussing recent cases applying the political 
question doctrine). 
34  See Rautenbach 2012 TSAR 20, 28 (suggesting that the political question doctrine should not be 
adopted in South Africa because it is highly controversial in its land of origin). 
35  It was first considered in Tuffour v Attorney-General 1980 GLR 637, 651-652 (hereafter Tuffour) 
(holding that "courts cannot enquire into the legality or illegality of what happened in Parliament. 
In so far as Parliament has acted by virtue of the powers conferred upon it by the Constitution, 
its actions within Parliament are a closed book"). 
36  See Asare 2006 http://www.ghanaweb.com/GhanaHomePage/NewsArchive/ 
artikel.php?ID=113967 (arguing against the application of the political question doctrine in 
Ghana); JH Mensah v Attorney-General 1996-97 SCGLR 320 (hereafter Mensah) (holding that the 
political question doctrine as applied in the United States is not applicable in Ghana); Amidu v 
President Kufuor 2001-2002 SCGLR 138, 152 (hereafter Amidu) (Kpegah dissenting opinion) 
(arguing that the political question doctrine is applicable to Ghana); Ghana Bar Association v 
Attorney-General 2003-2004 SCGLR 250 (hereafter Ghana Bar Association) (holding that the 
political question doctrine barred the Supreme Court from scrutinising the decision of the 
President to appoint the Chief Justice); New Patriotic Party v Attorney-General (31st December 
Case) 1993-94 2 GLR 35 SC (hereafter 31 December Case); Asare v Attorney-General (AP) 
unreported case number 21/2006 (15 September 2006). 
37  See Bimpong-Buta Role of the Supreme Court 129-130 (suggesting that there is no proper legal 
authority for the application of the political question doctrine in Ghana); Redish 1984 NWU L Rev 
1031 (making similar observations about the disagreements of the application of the political 
question doctrine in the United States context); Asare v Attorney-General (AP) unreported case 
number 21/2006 (15 September 2006) (where the political question doctrine was most recently 
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there is agreement that the political question doctrine is a function of the separation 
of powers principle enshrined in the Ghanaian Constitution, and that its 
jurisprudential basis was influenced by case law from the United States Supreme 
Court.38 Justice Kpegah, who was one of the strongest advocates of the doctrine in 
the Ghanaian Supreme Court, has offered the most comprehensive and convincing 
articulation of the basis of the political question doctrine under the Ghanaian 
Constitution.  
In his dissenting opinion in Amidu v President Kufuor,39 Justice Kpegah explains that 
the Constitution of Ghana is written and underpinned by the principle of the 
separation of powers. In his view, being a written Constitution, it has certain 
attributes. Among them is that the form of government envisages three important 
arms of government, namely the executive, legislature and judiciary.40 Another 
attribute, maintains Justice Kpegah, is that these various arms of government have 
their respective power laid down with limits not to be infringed by any other arm of 
government.41 Justice Kpegah reminds us that these limits expressed in the 
Constitution would be meaningless and serve no purpose if freely ignored or 
infringed by any arm of government.42 Constitutional commentators agree with 
Justice Kpegah's pronouncement, arguing that: 
… by simultaneously dividing power among the three arms of government and 
institutionalising methods that allow each branch to check the other, a Constitution 
reduces the likelihood that one faction will be able to implement its political agenda 
in conflict with the wishes of the people.43 
                                                                                                                                                  
applied). See Wishik 1985 Wash L Rev 697 (discussing that scholars disagree on whether the 
political question doctrine exists at all, and if it does exist, on whether it is constitutionally 
defined or is a flexible, prudential tool to protect the court's authority). 
38  See Ghana Bar Association (Hayfron-Benjamin concurring opinion) (explaining that although in 
Tuffour, the Supreme Court did not use the term non-justiciable political question, they reached 
conclusions which accord with justice Brennan's dictum in Baker). 
39  Amidu v President Kufuor 2001-2002 SCGLR 138. 
40  Amidu 153. 
41  Amidu 153. 
42  Amidu 153-54. 
43  See Magill 2000 Va L Rev 1127; Calabresi and Larsen 1994 Cornell L Rev 1045, 1052 (arguing 
that a separation of personnel, as well as of institutions, is absolutely vital to the fostering of 
competition and to the de-concentration of power); Redish and Cisar 1991 Duke LJ 449, 451; 
Redish Constitution As Political Structure; Calabresi and Rhodes 1992 Harv L Rev 1153; Liberman 
1989 Am U L Rev 313; Bruff 1979 Yale LJ 451; Strauss 1978 Cornell L Rev 488; Farina 1989 
Colum L Rev 452. 
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Justice Kpegah goes on to explain that while the Constitution of Ghana is expressed 
as the supreme law of Ghana, there is an inherent indication in the text that the 
policy which informs or should inform any legislation and the desire to enact such 
legislation are matters for the political branches of government to determine.44 On 
the other hand, Kpegah concedes that the interpretation and enforcement of the law 
passed by the legislature fall within the functions of the judiciary. In his view, the 
question of whether an Act of parliament is constitutionally valid or not is not a 
political question and the judiciary is not barred from deciding it.45 He teaches us 
that when the judiciary examines whether parliament has breached the 
constitutional limits on its legislative powers it is not engaging in determining 
political questions, because judiciaries have the power to make these 
determinations. For Kpegah, this distinction is important and must be maintained.46 
One of Kpegah's colleagues on the bench, Chief Justice Archer, agreed with the 
importance of maintaining this distinction when he said: 
The Constitution gives the judiciary power to interpret and enforce the Constitution 
and I do not think that this independence enables the judiciary to do what it likes 
by undertaking incursions into territory reserved for Parliament and the executive. 
This court should not behave like an octopus stretching its eight tentacles here and 
there to grab jurisdiction not constitutionally meant for it. I hold that this court has 
no constitutional power to prevent the executive from proclaiming 31 December as 
a public holiday.47 
Clearly, Justice Kpegah and other justices of the Supreme Court of Ghana are of the 
view that the political question doctrine did not evolve in American jurisprudence 
due to the fact that the courts were not expressly endowed with the power of 
judicial review in the United States Constitution.48 Instead, they view the doctrine as 
                                               
44  Amidu 154. 
45  Amidu 154. 
46  Justice Ngcobo agrees with the need to maintain this distinction and explains that "when a court 
decides whether parliament has complied with its express constitutional obligation, such as a 
provision that requires statutes to be passed by a specified majority, it does not infringe upon 
the principle of separation of powers or determine a political question". Ngcobo maintains that 
"what the court is simply doing in such a case is to decide the formal question of whether there 
was the required majority". See Doctors for Life International v Speaker of the National Assembly 
2006 12 BCLR 1399 (CC) para 25 (hereafter Doctors for Life International). 
47  Amidu 154 citing 31 December Case 49. 
48  Amidu 154. 
MO MHANGO  PER / PELJ 2014(17)6 
2713 
 
a necessary function of the universal principle of separation of powers.49 There are 
at least three Supreme Court decisions and one high court decision that either 
openly applied or considered the political question doctrine in post-1992 Ghana.  
3.1  Upholding a legislative decision to declare a public holiday as a 
political question 
The first case that considered the political question doctrine was New Patriotic Party 
v Attorney-General (31 December Case).50 The plaintiff in this case was the New 
Patriotic Party (the New Party), the main opposition political party at the time. It 
brought a law suit seeking a declaration pursuant to section 2(1) of the Constitution 
1992 that the planned public holiday and celebration of the coup d'état in Ghana on 
31 December 1981 was in conflict with the Constitution. In its defence the 
government invoked the political question doctrine as articulated in Baker v Carr to 
bar the Supreme Court from adjudicating the matter. The government argued that 
the question of whether or not 31 December should be declared a public holiday was 
a non-justiciable political question. 
In a five to four decision, the majority of the Supreme Court led by Justice Adade 
rejected the government's argument. It reasoned that since the "... Constitution is 
essentially a political document almost every matter of interpretation or enforcement 
which may arise from it is bound to be political, or at least to have a political 
dimension",51 which fact cannot be a basis to deprive the Supreme Court of its 
judicial powers. Further, it explained that the Supreme Court has jurisdiction to 
determine political questions in exercising its constitutional duty of enforcing or 
interpreting the Constitution under articles 2(1)52 and 130.53 According to the 
                                               
49  Amidu 155. Also see Birkey 1999 CLR 1271 (arguing that the political question doctrine is a 
function of the separation of powers doctrine); Reich 1977 Colum L Rev 466 (arguing that the 
judiciary's reluctance to decide political questions stems from its respect for the separation of 
powers between the judiciary and the elected branches of government); and Harvey 1988 J 
Marshall L Rev 341, 356 (arguing that the political question doctrine is based on the separation 
of powers). 
50  31 December Case.  
51  31 December Case 65. 
52  Section 2 of the Constitution of the Republic of Ghana, 1992 provides as follows: "(1) A person 
who alleges that - (a) an enactment or anything contained in or done under the authority of that 
or any other enactment; or (b) any act or omission of any person; is inconsistent with, or is in 
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Supreme Court, the question of whether the celebration of the 31 December seizure 
of power from the then Government of Ghana was in conflict with the Constitution 
required an interpretation of the Constitution, which the Supreme Court had 
jurisdiction to determine. It held that the political question doctrine was not 
applicable in Ghana because the Supreme Court as the ultimate interpreter of the 
Constitution pursuant to articles 2(1) and 130 may lawfully decide controversies of a 
political nature. There is general agreement among commentators upon the views of 
the Supreme Court in 31 December Case that nothing prevents courts from deciding 
political controversies; however, that cases that are too political fall within the 
political question doctrine.54 
Throwing his weight behind the majority decision, Justice Amua-Sekyi made the 
following observation about the reach of the Supreme Court's powers under the 
Constitution: 
It was said that the issue is a political one that the plaintiff ought to have made its 
complaint to Parliament. However, there is nothing to stop it from making a legal 
issue of it and coming to this court for redress. As the fundamental law, the 
Constitution controls all legislation and determines their validity. It is for the courts 
to ensure that all agencies of the state keep within their lawful bounds.55 
Evidently, Justice Amua-Sekyi views Supreme Court powers as broad enough to 
encompass political questions. On the other hand, the minority view was that the 
issue before the Supreme Court was a political question and more appropriate for 
the executive and legislature to determine. In her powerful dissenting view, Justice 
                                                                                                                                                  
contravention of a provision of this Constitution, may bring an action in the Supreme Court for a 
declaration to that effect." 
53  Section 130 of the Constitution provides in pertinent as follows: "The Supreme Court shall have 
exclusive original jurisdiction in - (a) all matters relating to the enforcement or interpretation of 
this Constitution; and (b) all matters arising as to whether an enactment was made in excess of 
the powers conferred on Parliament or any other authority or person by law or under this 
Constitution." 
54  See Free 2003 Pac Rim L & Pol'y J 489; LaTourette 2008 Rutgers LJ 282 (arguing that the 
political question doctrine can be used to avoid deciding cases that are too complicated or 
politically charged); Fickes 2009 Temp L Rev 531 (arguing that the Supreme Court's willingness 
to determine the most politically contentious issues in recent years demonstrates that the courts 
will not shy away from resolving legal disputes merely because they touch upon politically 
controversial issues); Willig 2010 Cardozo L Rev 732; Chase 2001 Cath U L Rev 1055; May 2008 
Denv U L Rev 919, 953 (arguing that a political issue and a political question are two different 
things. The former allows judicial oversight; the latter suggests that overriding separation of 
powers concerns warrant judicial restraint); Ekpu 1996 Ariz J Int'l & Comp L 1. 
55  31 December Case 130. 
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Bamford-Addo reasoned that "... the fixing of 31 December as a public holiday was 
not offensive to the Constitution but a policy choice".56 According to Justice 
Bamford-Addo, any government has the freedom to adopt a policy choice, through 
legislation, to scrap or insert 31 December from the list of public holidays in the 
legislation.57 Thus, since the fixing of 31 December was a policy choice, the minority 
view was that the political question doctrine barred the Supreme Court from deciding 
the matter as a means of demonstrating respect to the other arms of government. 
In his support of the minority views, Justice Archer defended the theme of the 
political question doctrine and reasoned that: 
I think if the order is granted, it would amount to judicial officiousness - poking 
our noses into the affairs of Parliament and intermeddling with the prerogative 
of the executive by directing the government not to spend moneys approved 
by Parliament. Such a move clearly amounts to a violation of the doctrine of 
separation of powers which is the core of our Constitution.58 
It is important to point out that while siding with the majority on the question of 31 
December celebrations, Justice Hayfron-Benjamin differed from the majority on the 
broad question of whether the political question doctrine was applicable in Ghana. 
Justice Hayfron-Benjamin confidently stated that:  
The whole principle of a non-justiciable political question is an American 
formulation. While it may be relevant to our situation because it is a 
development from a written democratic Constitution, I think there are so 
few parallels between the two Constitutions on this principle that its application 
to our Constitution, 1992 must necessarily be limited. It seems to me therefore 
that by the nature of our Constitution the principle of a non-justiciable political 
question can only arise where the Constitution expressly commits a particular 
responsibility to some arm of government. A clear example may be the power of 
the President to appoint ambassadors under article 74(1) of the Constitution.59 
Despite the ruling in 31 December Case, the Supreme Court in Ghana Bar 
Association v Attorney-General60 categorically held that the political question 
doctrine was applicable in Ghana.  
  
                                               
56  31 December Case 153. 
57  31 December Case 153. 
58  31 December Case 52. 
59  31 December Case 179. 
60  Ghana Bar Association. 
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3.2  Upholding the appointment of a Chief Justice as a political question 
In Ghana Bar Association, the President acting under articles 91(1)61 and 144(1)62 of 
the Constitution nominated Justice Abban as the Chief Justice for approval by 
Parliament. In turn, Parliament approved the nomination and Justice Abban was duly 
appointed by the President on 22 February 1995. The Ghana Bar Association (GBA) 
objected to this appointment. It brought a lawsuit before the Supreme Court in 
which it sought a declaration that Justice Abban was not a person of high moral 
character and proven integrity and thus not appointable as Chief Justice. The GBA 
also sought a declaration that the appointment of Justice Abban by the President as 
Chief Justice, as well as the advice of the Council of State and the approval by 
Parliament of his nomination, was unconstitutional.  
The government defended the case by challenging the jurisdiction of the Supreme 
Court to hear the matter. Anyone who is familiar with Barkow's work on the political 
question doctrine would understand that the reason the threshold question raised by 
the government was directed at the courts' jurisdiction was that the "… political 
question doctrine requires courts at the outset of every case to determine whether 
the Constitution gives some interpretive authority to the political branches on the 
question being raised and to specify the boundaries of what has been allocated 
elsewhere".63 Barkow argues that "… just as legislation may commit a question 
entirely to agency discretion, so too does the Constitution recognize that some 
constitutional questions rest entirely within the absolute discretion of the political 
branches".64  
 
                                               
61  Section 91(1) of the Constitution of the Republic of Ghana, 1992 reads as follows: "The Council 
of State shall consider and advise the President or any other authority in respect of any 
appointment which is required by this Constitution or any other law to be made in accordance 
with the advice of, or in consultation with, the Council of State." 
62  Section 144(1) of the Constitution of the Republic of Ghana, 1992 reads as follows: "The Chief 
Justice shall be appointed by the President acting in consultation with the Council of State and 
with the approval of Parliament." 
63  Barkow 2002 Colum L Rev 239. 
64  Barkow 2002 Colum L Rev 239 
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In line with Barkow's thinking, the government's main argument in Ghana Bar 
Association was that by virtue of the principle of separation of powers enshrined in 
the Constitution, the appointment of Justice Abban as Chief Justice was a non-
justiciable political question specifically committed to the President, Council of State 
and Parliament. On the contrary, the GBA argued that the Supreme Court, pursuant 
to articles 295 and 125(3) of the Constitution, has the final judicial power to 
determine whether any person or authority has properly performed his, her or its 
functions under the Constitution or any other law. As a result, the political question 
doctrine was not applicable to Ghana.65 
Justice Kpegah, who wrote for the majority, held that the political question doctrine 
was applicable to Ghana. He reasoned that the doctrine was implicit in the concept 
of the separation of powers, where certain functions are committed to a specific 
branch of government. In such a constitutional design, he reasoned, a political 
question cannot evolve into a judicial question.66 In support of Justice Kpegah, 
Weinberg has argued that in "a system where government is composed of three co-
equal branches, the interpretation and enforcement of the constitutional law cannot 
be entrusted entirely to the judiciary or the elected branches" but must be 
understood as a shared responsibility.67 To a great extent, this view is shared by 
Barkow. In her view, the political question doctrine "… reflects a constitutional 
design that does not require the judiciary to supply the substantive content of all 
constitutional provisions".68 Consistent with these views, Justice Kpegah held that 
article 144 of the Constitution committed the appointment of the Chief Justice to the 
executive branch and legislative branch, and that any attempt by the Supreme Court 
to claim a power to be able to declare null and void the appointment of the Chief 
Justice would justly be described as a usurpation of the constitutional functions of 
both the executive and legislative branches.69 Kpegah was convinced that by 
                                               
65  Defenders of the political question doctrine oppose arguments like this one raised by the GBA, 
which presuppose that the judiciary has the final say on the interpretation of the Constitution. 
They argue that the judiciary shares interpretive authority with the other branches of 
government. See Mulhern 1988 U Pa L Rev 101; Bickel Least Dangerous Branch 183-197. 
66  Ghana Bar Association 294. 
67  See Weinberg 1994 U Colo L Rev 887. 
68  Barkow 2002 Colum L Rev 239. 
69  Ghana Bar Association 301. 
MO MHANGO  PER / PELJ 2014(17)6 
2718 
 
assuming the jurisdiction to adjudicate the matter, the Supreme Court would be 
entering upon policy determinations for which judicially manageable standards were 
not available.70 In other words, by assuming jurisdiction the Supreme Court would 
be supplying substantive content to the constitutional provisions concerning the 
appointment of a Chief Justice, which, in his view, it cannot do.71 
In addressing the general question of the applicability of the political question 
doctrine in Ghana, Justice Kpegah reasoned that there were enough local authorities 
to support its application,72 and since the political question doctrine was a concept 
that emanated from the notion of the separation of powers, the Supreme Court 
ought to endeavour to apply it. Justice Kpegah laid down three common 
characteristics by which to determine whether a case raises a political question, 
namely: (1) does the issue involve the resolution of questions committed by the text 
of the Constitution to a co-ordinate branch of government; (2) would a resolution of 
the question demand that a court move beyond areas of judicial expertise; and (3) 
do prudential considerations counsel against judicial intervention.73 
He criticized and dismissed the proposition by Justice Adade in the 31 December 
Case that the political question doctrine does not apply to the United States 
Supreme Court, which reasoning Justice Adade employed to deny the application of 
that doctrine in that case. In his view, Justice Adade's majority opinion in the 31 
December Case was a very simplistic way to consider a serious legal concept such as 
the political question doctrine.74 In support of Justice Kpegah, Justice Hayfron-
Benjamin commented that the political question doctrine "… is certainly one of the 
                                               
70  In Nigeria appellate courts have taken a view similar to that of Ghanaian courts. See Onuoha v 
Okafor 1983 NSCC 494 (holding that the lack of satisfactory criteria for a judicial determination 
of a political question is one of the dominant considerations in determining whether a question 
falls within the category of political questions); and Balarabe Musa v Auta Hamzat 1983 3 NCLR 
229, 247 (holding that the impeachment of a State governor was a political question not 
appropriate for judicial review. Justice Ademola reasoned that "impeachment proceedings are 
political and for the court to enter into the political thicket as the invitation made to it clearly 
implies in my view asking its gates and its walls to be painted with mud; and the throne of 
justice from where its judgments are delivered polished with mire"). Also see Mhango 2013 AJLS 
249 (discussing the development and application of the political question doctrine in Uganda). 
71  Barkow 2002 Colum L Rev 239. 
72  Tuffour (Justice Sowah opinion); 31 December Case (Archer opinion; and Jutice Hayfron-
Benjamin opinion). 
73  Ghana Bar Association 300. 
74  Ghana Bar Association 294. 
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grounds upon which the jurisdiction of this court may be ousted".75 He went on to 
say that Tuffour, which is cited as authority for the political question doctrine in 
Ghana, "… reached conclusions which accord with Justice Brennan's dictum in Baker 
v Carr".76 While Justice Kpegah in Ghana Bar Association recognised the application 
of the political question doctrine in Ghana, he accepted the limits of its application 
and held that the mere fact that a lawsuit seeks the protection of a political right 
does not mean that it presents a non-justiciable political question.77 The decision in 
Ghana Bar Association was considered in Mensah v Attorney-General, in which the 
Supreme Court reached a different conclusion about the application of the political 
question doctrine in that case.  
3.3  Dismissing the appointment of cabinet ministers as a political 
question 
In Mensah v Attorney- General the term of office of President Rawlings had ended 
on 6 January 1997. The next day, President Rawlings, who had been re-elected as 
President in the previous month, was sworn in as President for a second term of four 
years. Soon after the swearing in, it was announced that the President had decided 
to retain in office some of his previous ministers and deputy ministers. It was also 
announced that since the appointment of those retained ministers had been 
approved by the previous Parliament, there was no need for them to be reapproved 
by the new Parliament. That decision was opposed by the opposition party in 
Parliament. Subsequent to this announcement it was also announced that one of the 
retained Ministers, the Minister of Finance, would appear before Parliament to 
present the 1997 Budget Statement. Before the Minister could do so the leader of 
the opposition party Hon. Mensah filed a lawsuit in the Supreme Court. The Plaintiff 
asked the Supreme Court to declare, among other things, that the Constitution 
prevented anyone from acting as a Minister without the prior approval of the newly 
elected second Parliament. The government defended the lawsuit by arguing, inter 
alia, that the process by which Parliament exercised its powers such as the approval 
                                               
75  Amidu v President Kufuor 148, citing Ghana Bar Association. 
76  Amidu v President Kufuor 148, citing Ghana Bar Association. 
77  Ghana Bar Association 295. 
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of ministerial nominations could not be questioned by the judiciary under the 
political question doctrine. 
The Supreme Court, as per Justice Acquah, held that every presidential nominee for 
ministerial appointment, whether retained or new, required the prior approval of 
Parliament. Justice Acquah reasoned that unlike the United States Supreme Court 
which derives its power of judicial review through jurisprudential authority, the 
Supreme Court of Ghana derives its power of judicial review from articles 2 and 130 
of the Constitution. Any limitation on that power, he argued, would have to find 
support in the language of those articles. On this point, Barkow has remarked that 
although judicial review is the norm, as Justice Acquah suggests, there are 
exceptions which are expressed in particular provisions in a Constitution.78 In the 
American context, Barkow asserts that the Constitution carves out certain categories 
of issues that may be resolved as a matter of legislative or executive discretion.79 
Under this view of the political question doctrine, judicial abstinence is seen as 
constitutionally required and not discretionary.80 
However, in his analysis Justice Acquah expressed some reservations about the 
political question doctrine. Specifically, he saw one potential interpretation of the 
doctrine which could be perceived as granting political immunity for breaches of the 
Constitution by the elected branches of government. In turn he offered his preferred 
understanding of the doctrine which, in his view, complied with Ghana's 
constitutional design. I call his preferred understanding the "compromised political 
question doctrine". He says: 
 
                                               
78  Barkow 2002 Colum L Rev 247-248. 
79  Barkow 2002 Colum L Rev 247-248 
80  Barkow 2002 Colum L Rev 247-248; Wechsler 1959 Harv L Rev 9 (arguing that the only 
judgment that may lead to an abstention from decision is that the Constitution has committed 
the determination of the issue to another agency of government than the courts); Gouin 1994 
Conn L Rev 759, 780, 796-797 (discussing the classical version of the political question doctrine 
and noting that the Constitution committed some constitutional issues to the political branches); 
Cutaiar 2009 Loy LA L Rev 393, 398 (arguing that the political question doctrine is a product of 
constitutional interpretation rather than judicial discretion). 
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If by the political question doctrine, it is meant that where the Constitution allocates 
power or function to an authority, and that authority exercises that power within 
the parameters of that provision and the Constitution as a whole, a court has no 
jurisdiction to interfere with the exercise of that function, then I entirely agree that 
the doctrine applies in our constitutional jurisprudence. For this is what is implied in 
the concept of separation of powers. But if by the doctrine, it is meant that even 
when the authority exercises that power in violation of the constitutional provision, 
a court has no jurisdiction to interfere because it is the Constitution which allocated 
that power to that authority, then I emphatically disagree.81 
I believe Justice Acquah's statement above is a perfect expression of what Cowper 
and Sossin identified as the difficulty with the political question doctrine, which lies 
in the failure by some jurists to distinguish between "… questions which the judiciary 
must resolve, no matter how politically sensitive, and those that raise separation of 
powers concerns and should therefore be dismissed by the judiciary".82 It is possible 
that I have given Justice Acquah an unfair reading, but I cannot help but believe 
that there is a failure to appreciate the significance of the above distinction in Justice 
Acquah's reasoning.  
In explaining the distinction that must be made in cases involving political questions, 
Redish offered a useful suggestion which (while made in the American context 
during the 1980s) addresses Justice Acquah's assertion above. Redish postulates 
that in those cases that raise separation of powers concerns and should be 
dismissed, the "… judiciary does not abdicate its power to interpret and enforce the 
Constitution"; rather it simply holds "… that nothing in the Constitution directs the 
political branch as to how to exercise its constitutionally granted power".83 Redish 
further maintains that "… when the Constitution's framers intended that one of the 
political branches has discretion to act, the text says so, by vesting decision making 
power in those branches without simultaneously indicating the parameters of that 
                                               
81  Mensah 368 
82  Cowper and Sossin 2002 Sup Ct L Rev 343. Also see Price 2006 NYU J Int'l L & Pol 323; and May 
2008 Denv U L Rev 919, 953 (arguing that a political issue and a political question are two 
different things. The former allows judicial oversight and the latter suggests that overriding 
separation of powers concerns warrant judicial restraint). 
83  Redish 1984 NWU L Rev 1039. Also see 31 December Case (Justice Adade) (arguing that "to 
refuse to hear a constitutional case on the ground that it is political is to abdicate our 
responsibilities under the Constitution and breach its provisions"). 
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discretion".84 In the South African case of Doctors for Life International, Justice 
Ngcobo accepts the distinction advocated by Redish. Ngcobo explains it this way: 
It seems to me therefore that a distinction should be drawn between constitutional 
provisions that impose obligations that are readily ascertainable and are unlikely to 
give rise to disputes, on the one hand, and those provisions which impose the 
primary obligation on Parliament to determine what is required of it, on the other. 
In the case of the former, a determination whether those obligations have been 
fulfilled does not call upon a court to pronounce upon a sensitive aspect of the 
separation of powers. It simply decides the formal question whether there was, for 
example, the two-thirds majority required to pass the legislation. By contrast, 
where the obligation requires Parliament to determine in the first place what is 
necessary to fulfil its obligation, a review by a court whether that obligation has 
been fulfilled, trenches on the autonomy of Parliament to regulate its own affairs 
and thus the principle of separation of powers.85 
If the political question doctrine can be understood in this way, it becomes easier to 
see the flaw in Justice Acquah's stance.  
In his pronouncement above, Justice Acquah addresses and accepts the application 
of the political question doctrine in circumstances where he claims the Constitution 
allocates power to the political branches and indicates the parameters for the 
exercise of such power. However, Justice Acquah fails to address the instances 
where the Constitution allocates power or discretion to the political branches without 
at the same time indicating the parameters of that discretion or power. By this 
failure Justice Acquah creates the impression that in those other instances the 
judiciary will have a final say concerning those constitutional questions. Barkow 
disagrees with this suggestion and correctly argues that the "constitution's structure 
and the limited powers of the judiciary require political branches to decide 
constitutional questions in many instances, and in such instances they have the 
same authority to make decisions as the judiciary itself has in other instances.86  
Perhaps Justice Acquah would find consolation in the fact that "… the judiciary has 
the authority, through constitutional interpretation, to determine whether an issue 
presented a political question committed to the political branches to remedy or a 
                                               
84  Redish 1984 NWU L Rev 1047. 
85  Doctors for Life International 1414-1415. 
86  Barkow 2002 Colum L Rev 320. 
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judicial question, which the judiciary must answer".87 Redish was correct in noting 
that it is: 
… vital to distinguish between what he calls substantive deference, where the 
judiciary while retaining power to render final decisions on the meaning of the 
constitutional limits, nevertheless takes into account the need for expertise, and 
procedural deference, where the judiciary decides that resort to the courts 
constitutes the wrong procedure because the decision is exclusively that of the 
political branches.88 
At least to some extent Redish's arguments and comments were directed towards 
the views of Justice Acquah and other like-minded jurists.  
Notwithstanding Justice Acquah's failure to distinguish between justiciable and non-
justiciable questions, there is something to celebrate about his perspective. He 
endorses the political question doctrine in Ghana and accepts, like some 
commentators, that certain constitutional provisions require deference to the other 
branches, but has reservations about accepting that in cases involving political 
questions absolute deference is required.89 I describe Justice Acquah's position as a 
compromise political question doctrine because he accepts what Savitzky explains as 
the need to balance the judiciary's role in checking unconstitutional government 
action with its duty not to usurp the political power exercised by the people through 
the executive and legislative branches.90 The problem, as I have tried to show, is 
that Justice Acquah, at the time of his writing, had not yet fully thought out the 
                                               
87  See Scharpf 1966 Yale LJ 538 (explaining that the basic idea of the political question doctrine is 
that it is an outcome of constitutional interpretation); Kelly 2010 Miss C L Rev 219, 224 
(discussing the idea that the purpose of the political question doctrine is to bar claims that 
threaten the separation-of-powers design of the federal government, and thus a determination 
as to the justiciability of a claim is a delicate exercise in constitutional interpretation, not merely 
plugging facts into factors.); Barkow 2002 Colum L Rev 249; Marbury 167, 170-171. 
88  Redish 1984 NWU L Rev 1048-1049. 
89  Barkow 2002 Colum L Rev 244, 319 (arguing that the political question doctrine is part of a 
spectrum of deference to the political branches' interpretation of the Constitution. Barkow claims 
that the political question doctrine requires the judiciary to determine as a threshold matter in all 
cases whether the question before it has been assigned by the Constitution to another branch of 
government. This initial determination of how much deference is appropriate serves a valuable 
function because it reminds the judiciary that not all constitutional questions require independent 
judicial interpretation); and Mulhern 1988 U Pa L Rev 124-127 (discussing dissenting voices 
against the judicial monopoly and emphasising equal authority among the three branches on 
constitutional matters. Mulhern argues that there is no obvious reason why a court's assertion of 
judicial power should be any more authoritative than a President's assertion of executive power. 
Both are part of our constitutional tradition, and there is no apparent way to establish any 
priority between them). 
90  Savitzky 2011 NY L Rev 2043. 
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practicalities of this balance, or may not have been convinced that the facts in 
Mensah v Attorney-General presented an opportunity to develop that balance. 
Justice Aikins agreed with Justice Acquah's opinion in Mensah v Attorney-General 
and wrote his own concurring opinion. He dismissed the government's contention 
and held that the Supreme Court was entitled to decide questions of a political 
nature "… since in Ghana it is the Constitution and not Parliament which is 
supreme".91 Further, Aikins held that any act of Parliament which is in conflict with 
the Constitution can be declared null and void even though the Act dealt with a 
political question.92 While the political question doctrine was dismissed as not 
applicable in Mensah v Attorney General, in his concurring opinion Justice Aikins 
conceded that the doctrine was increasingly creeping into Ghanaian legal 
jurisprudence.93 To further enhance this concession and solidify the political question 
doctrine in Ghana, Aikins distinguished Tuffuor, the first case that considered the 
political question doctrine in Ghana, from Mensah v Attorney-General.94 This is an 
important development because as Bimpong-Buta has observed Tuffuor, together 
with the dicta from the opinions of Justices Archer and Hayfron-Benjamin in 31 
December Case, has been cited as authority in support for the application of the 
political question doctrine in Ghana.95 In other words, by distinguishing Mensah v 
Attorney-General from Tuffuor, Justice Aikins' pronouncement can be read as 
bringing clarity in the law that the political question doctrine is applicable in Ghana.  
3.4  Upholding a legislative decision to retain a Member of Parliament as 
a political question 
The above jurisprudence reflects the Supreme Court's efforts to formulate a 
consistent political question doctrine for Ghana.96 This jurisprudence has had 
                                               
91  Mensah 344. 
92  Mensah 344. 
93  Mensah 341. 
94  Mensah 348. 
95  See Bimpong-Buta Role of the Supreme Court 129. 
96  At least Justice Kpegah conceded that the Supreme Court has not been consistent in its 
application of the political question doctrine and other justiciability principles derived from the 
United States. He observes that the doctrine was applied in Tuffour without the court specifically 
saying so, but rejected in the 13 December Case and subsequently applied in Ghana Bar 
Association, where the 13 December Case was criticised. See Amidu 145-147. 
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influence in the lower court's application of the doctrine. One of the most recent 
lower court cases applying the political question doctrine is Asare v Attorney-
General.97 In this case, a member of Parliament Mr Eric Amoateng was arrested and 
detained in the United States for unlawfully importing narcotics into that country. 
Under the rules of Parliament, Mr Amoeteng sought leave of absence from 
Parliament, which was granted from 17 to 24 November 2005. Further, Parliament's 
Committee on Privileges considered the reasonableness of Mr Amoaeteng's absence 
from Parliament. On the strength of the criminal law principle that everyone is 
presumed innocent until proven guilty by a court of law, and the need to extend 
compassion to Amoaeteng due to the slow pace of his criminal trial in the United 
States, the Committee on Privileges recommended that Parliament allow Amoaeteng 
the required time to defend his criminal charges.  
After some debate, Parliament approved this recommendation and decided to grant 
Amoaeteng a dispensation to be absent from Parliament indefinitely. This decision by 
Parliament was challenged by the plaintiff, Stephen Asare. The plaintiff's claim was 
that since the Speaker permitted Amoaeteng to be absent from 17 to 24 November 
only, Amoaeteng's seat became vacant by operation of law and neither the Speaker 
nor Parliament could grant any other dispensation. Therefore the High Court, in this 
case, was seized to determine whether Parliament had the authority to grant a 
member of Parliament a dispensation to be absent from Parliament indefinitely.98 
Essentially the High Court had to determine at least two important related questions: 
firstly, whether the parliamentary seat of Amoaeteng became vacant by operation of 
law, and secondly, whether Parliament's decision to grant Amoaeteng a dispensation 
to be absent indefinitely from Parliament could be called into question on legal 
grounds as being unreasonable and unlawful. Justice Ayebi held that the political 
question doctrine applied in this case. In endorsing Justice Acquah's opinion in 
Mensah v Attorney-General, Justice Ayebi reasoned that "… it is parliament as the 
legislative arm of government which is mandated by the Constitution to determine 
                                               
97  Asare v Attorney-General (AP) unreported case number 21/2006 (15 September 2006). 
98  As Barkow puts it, the threshold question for every court, and in my view the High Court in 
Asare, should be to determine if the questions before it have been assigned by the Constitution 
to another branch of government. Barkow 2002 Colum L Rev 244. 
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the reasonableness or otherwise of Amoaeteng's explanation of his absence through 
the Committee on Privileges". Justice Ayebi found that this is what Parliament had 
done in this case. In his view "… the decision of Parliament will stand the test of 
time, and … it is a political question intra vires the Constitution and therefore not 
subject to judicial scrutiny".  
To best illustrate the suitability of applying the political question doctrine in this 
case, Justice Ayebi employed the following hypothetical scenario and said: 
… suppose the member of Parliament in this case was involved in a fatal accident 
on this trip and he was only able to inform Mr. Speaker long after fifteen sittings of 
Parliament. Doctors attending to him determined that it will take some time for him 
to recover. Should the court declare an indefinite dispensation granted to such 
Member of Parliament in such circumstances by parliament as unreasonable? 
Consequent upon that, should the court declare the seat of the Member of 
Parliament vacant? I think not, he observed.99 
Justice Ayebi's reasoning was that since Parliament found Amoaeteng's reasons for 
absence reasonable and granted indefinite dispensation in the particular 
circumstances of this case, that decision should not be subjected to judicial scrutiny.  
While Asare v Attorney-General has been criticised, this criticism has centered on the 
failure of Justice Ayebi to properly justify why the political question doctrine should 
have determined the case.100 In other words, Asare, who has expressed the most 
critical views against the decision in Asare v Attorney-General, agrees that the 
political question doctrine is applicable in Ghana, but that a court should offer 
convincing reasons for its application in any given case.101 What seems to ignite 
Asare's critical views on Asare v Attorney General is that Justice Ayebi's opinion, in 
his view, does not justify or explain the rationale for allowing the political question 
doctrine to swallow the court's explicit powers in article 99(1)(a) of the 
Constitution.102 Further, Asare criticises Justice Ayebi's failure to apply the three-
prong test announced in Ghana Bar Association to the facts in the case. Presumably, 
had this been done Justice Ayebi would have been forced to justify the application of 
                                               
99  Asare v Attorney-General (AP) unreported case number 21/2006 (15 September 2006). 
100  Asare v Attorney-General (AP) unreported case number 21/2006 (15 September 2006). 
101  Asare v Attorney-General (AP) unreported case number 21/2006 (15 September 2006). 
102  Asare v Attorney-General (AP) unreported case number 21/2006 (15 September 2006). 
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the political question doctrine in the case.103 Asare's criticism is reflective of the 
prevailing discourse around the doctrine in Ghana, namely that it forms part of 
Ghanaian law and Ghana Bar Association articulates how it ought to be applied. 
Therefore it seems clear from this discourse that the critical views against the recent 
application of the political question doctrine are not dismissive of the doctrine but 
are rather directed at what should be its proper application. 
3.5  The justiciability of directive policies and certain provisions of the 
Constitution 
What is clear from the above analysis is that the application of the political question 
doctrine requires an acceptance that there are certain constitutional questions or 
provisions that are not justiciable. This is why the doctrine is controversial. However, 
the issue of the justiciability or not of certain provisions of the Constitution of Ghana 
has been contested since the advent of constitutionalism in Ghana.104 As 
commentators have observed, one of the areas where this issue has come to the 
fore is chapter 6 of the Constitution.105 In particular, commentators note that Article 
34(1), the opening of chapter 6, creates some ambiguity.106 The article provides 
that:  
34 (1) The Directive Principles of State Policy contained in this Chapter shall guide 
all citizens, Parliament, the President, the Judiciary, the Council of State, the 
Cabinet, political parties and other bodies and persons in applying or interpreting 
this Constitution or any other law and in taking and implementing any policy 
decisions, for the establishment of a just and free society. 
The observation from scholars is that the ambiguity arose from the Consultative 
Assembly's reliance on the Report of the Committee of Experts on the Proposal for a 
Draft Constitution Ghana (Committee of Experts) to conclude that the Directive 
Principles in chapter 6 should not be justiciable.107 The rationale for the inclusion of 
                                               
103  Asare v Attorney-General (AP) unreported case number 21/2006 (15 September 2006). 
104  Quashigah date unknown http://www.icla.up.ac.za/images/country_reports/ghana_country_ 
report.pdf 14. 
105  Quashigah date unknown http://www.icla.up.ac.za/images/country_reports/ghana_country_ 
report.pdf 14; and Atupare 2014 Harv Hum Rts J 71. 
106  Quashigah date unknown http://www.icla.up.ac.za/images/country_reports/ghana_country_ 
report.pdf; and Atupare 2014 Harv Hum Rts J 71. 
107  Committee of Experts Report 97-97; 31 December Case 149. 
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these Directives Principles in chapter 6 was explained by the Committee of Experts 
as follows: 
94. The NCD report speaks of the need to include in the new Constitution 
'core principles around which national political, social and economic life will 
revolve.' This is precisely what the Directive Principles of State Policy seeks to 
do. Against the background of the achievements and failings of our post-
independence experience, and our aspirations for the future as a people, the 
principles attempt to set the stage for the enunciation of political, civil, 
economic and social rights of our people. They may thus be regarded as 
spelling out in broad strokes the spirit or conscience of the constitution. The 
Committee used Chapter Four of the 1979 Constitution as a basis for its 
deliberations on this subject. 
95. By tradition Directive Principles are not justiciable; even so, there are at 
least two good reasons for including them in a constitution. First, Directive 
Principles enumerate a set of fundamental objectives which a people expect 
all bodies and persons that make or execute public policy to strive to achieve. 
In the present proposals, one novelty is the explicit inclusion of political 
parties among the bodies expected to observe the principles. The reason for 
this is that political parties significantly influence government policy. A second 
justification for including Directive Principles in a constitution is that, 
taken together, they constitute, in the long run, a sort of barometer by 
which the people could measure the performance of their government. In 
effect they provide goals for legislative programmes and a guide for judicial 
interpretation. 
96. On the basis of the foregoing considerations, the Committee proposes as 
follows: The Directive Principles of State Policy are for the guidance of 
Parliament, the President, the Council of Minister, Political Parties and other 
bodies and persons in making and applying public policy for the 
establishment of a just and free society. The Principles should not of and by 
themselves be legally enforceable by any Court. The Court should, however, 
have regard to the said Principles in interpreting any laws based on them.108 
According to some scholars, the problem is that the final text of the Constitution 
omitted to expressly declare that the Directive Principles are non-justiciable, which 
left open the question of whether or not that omission points to the conclusion of 
non-justiciablity.109 Indeed, that omission has attracted distinct judicial 
pronouncements about the constitutional status of the Directive Principles. I discuss 
these pronouncements and how they relate to the application of the political 
question doctrine in Ghana.  
                                               
108  31 December Case 149. 
109  Quashigah date unknown http://www.icla.up.ac.za/images/country_reports/ghana_country_ 
report.pdf 14; and Atupare 2014 Harv Hum Rts J 95. 
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One of the earliest judicial pronouncements on the constitutional status of the 
Directive Principles was made in the 31 December Case. As Atupare has observed, 
the judgment in the 31 December Case on the justiciability of the Directive Principles 
was less dynamic.110 On the part of the majority, only Justice Adade openly tackled 
the issue and said:  
I do not subscribe to the view that chapter 6 of the Constitution is not 
justiciable: it is. First, the Constitution as a whole is a justiciable document. If 
any part is to be non-justiciable, the Constitution itself must say so. I have not 
seen anything in chapter 6 or in the Constitution generally, which tells me that 
chapter 6 is not justiciable. The evidence to establish the non-justiciability must 
be internal to the Constitution not otherwise … we cannot add words to the 
Constitution in order to change its meaning. The very tenor of chapter 6 of 
the Constitution supports the view that the chapter is justiciable. As far as the 
judiciary is concerned, I ask myself the question: How do the principles guide 
the judiciary in applying or interpreting the Constitution if not in the process 
of enforcing them?111 
What is more, Justice Adade took issue with the conclusion by the Committee of 
Experts that Directive Principles are traditionally non-justiciable. In his view, under 
chapter 4 of the Constitution 1979, Directive Principles were justiciable.112 Adade 
noted that while the debates in the Consultative Assembly may demonstrate some 
intention to make the Directive Principles non-justiciable, he concluded that "... the 
intention was not carried into the Constitution, and the debates themselves are 
inadmissible to contradict the language of the Constitution."113  
On the other hand, two justices wrote minority opinions on the justiciability of the 
Directive Principles in the 31 December Case. Justice Abban found that the Directive 
Principles were not relevant to the subject matter before the court, and that 
reference to them was totally misconceived.114 In her opinion, Justice Bamford-Addo 
unambiguously pronounced and reasoned that the Directive Principles: 
... are not justiciable and the plaintiff has no cause of action based on these 
articles. Those principles were included in the Constitution, for the guidance of 
all citizens, Parliament, the President, judiciary, the Council of State, the 
cabinet, political parties or other bodies and persons in applying or 
                                               
110  Atupare 2014 Harv Hum Rts J 95. 
111  31 December Case 66-67. 
112  31 December Case 69. 
113  31 December Case 69. 
114  31 December Case 102. 
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interpreting the Constitution or any other law and in taking and implementing 
any policy decisions, for the establishment of a just and free society. The 
judiciary is to be guided, while interpreting the Constitution by only the 
specific provisions under chapter 6.115 
Based on the above pronouncements, Atupare correctly commented that "... an 
important tension has emerged between the need to observe Directive Principles as 
legal duties of all government agencies and public officials as the inability of courts 
to directly enforce these Directive Principles."116Atupare is critical of the fact that no 
clear majority or minority view on the justiciability of Directive Principles emerged in 
the 31 December Case because several justices addressed or failed to address the 
issue. He correctly points out that "it is unclear whether the majority of the Supreme 
Court subscribed to the pronouncements of Justice Adade that Directive Principles 
are justiciable or if Justice Bamford-Addo's rebuttal of that claim was endorsed by 
the justices."117 Beneath Atupare's criticism is the notion that the issue of the 
justiciability of Directive Principles remained uncertain after the 31 December Case. 
This is clear from his submission that "... with Justice Adade and Justice Bamford-
Addo acting alone in advancing their respective views, the case did not reach a 
determination of whether the Directive Principles are justiciable."118  
While I understand Atupare's concerns, these concerns were short-lived because 
later, in New Patriotic Party v Attorney General (CIBA),119 the Supreme Court 
revisited the issue of the justiciability of Directive Principles and clarified the law. In 
CIBA the Supreme Court ruled that Directive Principles are not justiciable. Justices 
Ampiah and Akuffor, who wrote concurring opinions, openly found that Directive 
Principles are not justiciable, while Justice Atuguba described them as mere rules of 
construction.120 Justice Bamford-Addo, who wrote for the majority, had a slightly 
nuanced view to the proposition that Directive Principles are not justiciable. She 
reasoned that: 
                                               
115  31 December Case 149. 
116  Atupare 2014 Harv Hum Rts J 96. 
117  Atupare 2014 Harv Hum Rts J 96. 
118  Atupare 2014 Harv Hum Rts J 96. 
119  New Patriotic Party v Attorney General (CIBA) 1997 SCGLR 729 (hereafter CIBA). 
120  CIBA 752-761, 787, 791-803; Atupare 2014 Harv Hum Rts J 97. 
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... there are particular instances where some provisions of the Directive Principles 
form an integral part of some of the enforceable rights because either they qualify 
them or can be held to be rights in themselves. In those instances, they are of 
themselves justiciable also. Where those principles are read in conjunction with 
other enforceable provisions of the Constitution, by reason of the fact that the 
courts are mandated to apply them, they are justiciable. Further where any 
provision under chapter Six dealing with the Directive Principles can be interpreted 
to mean the creation of a legal right, ie a guaranteed fundamental human right as 
was done in article 37(2)(a) regarding the freedom to form associations, they 
become justiciable and protected by the Constitution.121 
While the judgment in CIBA has been welcomed by some commentators,122 Atupare 
has criticised the decision arguing that the majority opinions were indecisive about 
the justiciability of the Directive Principles.123 
Unlike Atupare, I find that the judgment in CIBA, read together with the wisdom of 
the minority views in the 31 December Case, clarified the constitutional status of 
Directive Principles. In my view the judgment in CIBA brought clarity to the law by 
holding that Directive Principles are in general not justiciable except when read with 
other justiciable provisions of the Constitution. As Justice Bamford-Addo puts it, the 
effect of this judgment is that "... having regard to the test of justiciability of any 
particular provision under chapter 6 of the Constitution, it is my view that each case 
would depend on its peculiar facts."124 This is because the general rule is that 
Directive Principles are not justiciable and the court will have to determine, in every 
case, whether the exception as pronounced in CIBA applies. In fact, despite his 
criticism of the judgment in CIBA, Atupare concedes that the judgment in CIBA was 
clearer than that in the 31 December Case on the question of the constitutional 
status of Directive Principles.125  
If the judgment in CIBA is not sufficiently clear on the issue of the justiciability of 
Directive Principles, as suggested by Atupare, the Supreme Court decision in Ghana 
Lotto Operators Association & Others v National Lottery Authority126 provides further 
clarity. In Ghana Lotto Operators Association the Supreme Court considered the 
                                               
121  CIBA 745-747. 
122  Nwauche 2010 AHRLJ 514 (suggesting that courts in Nigeria adopt the approach in CIBA). 
123  Atupare 2014 Harv Hum Rts J 97. 
124  CIBA. 
125  Atupare 2014 Harv Hum Rts J 97. 
126  Ghana Lotto Operators Association v National Lottery Authority 2007-2008 SCGLR 1088. 
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question of whether chapter 6 was justiciable or not. Justice Date-Bah, who wrote 
for the majority, reasoned that the "... starting point of analysis should be that all 
provisions in the Constitution are justiciable, unless there are strong indications to 
the contrary in the text or context of the Constitution."127 However, Justice Date-Bah 
further explains that: 
... there may be particular provisions in chapter 6 which do not lend themselves to 
enforcement by a court. The very nature of such a particular provision would rebut 
the presumption of justiciability in relation to it. In the absence of a demonstration 
that a particular provision does not lend itself to enforcement by courts, however, 
the enforcement by this court of the obligations imposed in chapter 6 should be 
insisted upon and would be a way of deepening our democracy and the liberty 
under law that it entails...This court will need to be flexible and imaginative in 
determining how the provisions of the chapter 6 are to be enforceable.128 
While the ambiguity concerning the justiciability of the provisions of chapter 6 has 
been definitively addressed, Justice Date-Bah posits that there are certain provisions 
that do not lend themselves to enforcement by courts.129  
Justices Date-Bah and Bamford-Addo's pronouncements in Ghana Lotto Operators 
Association and CIBA respectively are important ways by which Ghana's Constitution 
can be understood to recognize the application of the political question doctrine. My 
submission is that both Justice Date-Bah and Justice Bamford-Addo had in mind the 
applicability of the political question doctrine to Ghana's constitutional circumstances 
when they made their pronouncements above. In other words, the philosophical 
consideration which informed their pronouncement is the potential application of the 
political question doctrine.  
There is another point that needs to be highlighted about the pronouncements by 
Justices Date-Bah and Bamford-Addo, which further demonstrates why Atupare's 
criticism is no longer germane. These pronouncements have brought clarity in the 
law as to whether Directive Principles are justiciable or not. The difference between 
their pronouncements is that Justice Date-Bah holds that there is a presumption of 
                                               
127  Ghana Lotto Operators Association v National Lottery Authority 2007-2008 SCGLR 1088 1099. 
128  Ghana Lotto Operators Association v National Lottery Authority 2007-2008 SCGLR 1088 1106-
1107. 
129  Quashigah date unknown http://www.icla.up.ac.za/images/country_reports/ghana_country_ 
report.pdf 14. 
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justiciability of the Directive Principles, which can be rebutted, while Justice 
Bamford-Add holds that the Directive Principles are presumed not justiciable unless 
read with other justiciable provisions of the Constitution. In essence, the two legal 
positions are not in conflict with each other because both of them recognize the 
potential that certain provisions of the Constitution may not be justiciable. To 
address the potential criticism from those who might argue that these 
pronouncements are in conflict with each other or indecisive about the constitutional 
status of Directive Principles, Justice Date-Bah explains that: 
The two positions are convergent in that, if a particular provision of chapter 6 does 
not lend itself for enforcement by action in court, then in our preferred approach, 
the presumption of justiciability would be rebutted; while, similarly, the case by 
case approach of Bamford-Addo would result in the court finding that the provision 
in question does not create an enforceable right. The advantage of the presumption 
of justiciability is that it provides a clear starting rule that is supportive of the 
enforcement of fundamental human rights. 
Therefore, it is clear that the question of the constitutional status of Directive 
Principles is no longer uncertain, and that certain categories of constitutional issues 
may be resolved as a matter of legislative or executive discretion. This is why the 
political question remains relevant and part of Ghanaian law. 
4 Conclusion 
From the foregoing analysis, it is clear that the holding by the Supreme Court in 
Ghana Bar Association that the political question doctrine is applicable to the 
Constitution of Ghana has never been overruled.130 Ghana Bar Association and the 
wisdom in Mensah v Attorney General and the 31 December Case demonstrate that 
the political question doctrine forms part of Ghanaian constitutional law and, as in 
other countries where it is applied, it does not apply to every case involving a 
political question.131 The Supreme Court has discretion (though interpretative) to 
determine which matters are committed to the political branches and can discard 
                                               
130  For a contrary view see Bimpong-Buta Role of the Supreme Court 134-135 (arguing that the 
criticism in Ghana Bar Association on the issue of the application of the political question doctrine 
could be read as having overruled the decision in the 31 December Case). 
131  Free 2003 Pac Rim L & Pol'y J 489; LaTourette 2008 Rutgers LJ 282; Fickes 2009 Temp L Rev 
531; Willig 2010 Cardozo L Rev 732; Chase Cath U L Rev 1055; Barkow 2002 Colum L Rev 253, 
262-263. 
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them on that basis. I submit that Ghana Bar Association is such a case where the 
Supreme Court found that the questions in that case were properly committed to the 
political branches and decided to exercise restraint by applying the political question 
doctrine.  
However, it is clear from the case law that courts acknowledge the importance of 
the political question doctrine in Ghana's constitutional democracy, which is 
underpinned by the principle of the separation of powers. It is also clear in these 
cases and academic commentaries that judges disagree about which questions are 
most appropriate for its application. In other words, the debate among judges in 
Ghana is not whether or not the political question doctrine forms part of Ghanaian 
constitutional law; rather, it is whether or when the doctrine should apply in a 
particular case. It is pointless, in my view, to question as others have done132 
Tuffour and other local authorities that have been used to justify the political 
question doctrine in Ghana. 
                                               
132  Asare v Attorney-General (AP) unreported case number 21/2006 (15 September 2006) (arguing 
that both justice Abeyi and Kpegah improperly rely on Tuffour as the authority for the political 
question doctrine; that this doctrine was not an issue in Tuffour, nor was the holding in Tuffour 
an endorsement of or even a clarification of the doctrine); and the 31 December Case (where 
Justice Adade found that the political question doctrine cannot have any application in Ghana). 
Also see Bimpong-But Role of the Supreme Court 128-135 (suggesting that the political question 
doctrine should not apply to Ghana). 
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